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ARTICLES
A LITTLE LESS CONVERSATION, A LITTLE MORE
ACTION: EVALUATING AND FORECASTING THE
TREND OF MORE FREQUENT AND SEVERE
PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT
Justin F. Marceau *
In the wake of increasingly common, creative, and severe
prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),
scholars and practitioners must acknowledge that the time for talk—i.e.,
non-punitive voluntary disclosures and abstract debate—has given way
to an era of aggressive enforcement actions by the Department of Justice
and the Securities Exchange Commission. The bare numbers tell much
of the story: the Department of Justice has initiated four times more
prosecutions over the last five years than over the previous five years.1
Also instructive are prosecutors’ growing use of novel and ever more
broad theories of liability under the FCPA.
This Article outlines and discusses in particular the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA, then identifies recent controversial cases that
illustrate the government’s departure from its usual passive approach,
and how the government has embraced a more aggressive, or legal,
action position. In addition, this Article forecasts other forthcoming
theories of FCPA-liability that, although not yet advanced by the
*
Mr. Marceau graduated from Harvard Law School in 2004. He is currently
working as an Assistant Public Defender in the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of
Public Defender, District of Arizona. All views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the
Office of the Public Defender. The author wishes to thank his mother, Mary Marceau,
for her careful and timely editing of this piece. He also owes a debt of gratitude to his
wife, Rebecca Aviel, for her thoughtful comments throughout the writing process and
for marrying him in September of last year.
1. Dan Newcomb, Digests of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to
Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Feb. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.shearman.com/lt_022806/.
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Department of Justice, are likely forthcoming from prosecutors based on
their recent zealous theories of liability.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE FCPA
Based upon information regarding corporate corruption uncovered
during the Watergate investigations, the Securities and Exchange
Commission conducted a series of investigations designed to evaluate
how widespread the practice of corporate bribery to foreign officials had
become. 2 The Securities and Exchange Commission’s investigation
resulted in disclosures by over 400 companies that had engaged in bribes
or other corrupt payments. 3 Of these, some 200 companies admitted to
making bribe-type payments to foreign government officials. 4
Following these investigations, Congress held hearings to assess the
severity of the bribery problem, and possible solutions. 5 Shortly
thereafter, in December 1977, Congress, perceiving this to be an
epidemic, responded by passing the FCPA. 6
From its inception, the FCPA was a bold and unique piece of
legislation in that it criminalized conduct that Congress itself deemed
unethical, regardless of the customs and practices of the foreign country
where the company was doing business. 7 The Act’s impact in early
years was marred by controversies regarding the appropriateness of
legislating morals, 8 but corporate scandals in the 1990s readied the
public for the government’s taking a more direct role in enforcing

2. Dan Zarin, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 11 (2005); see also Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Priorities and Econ. in Gov’t of the Joint Econ. Comm., 94th Cong. 16-18 (1976)
(testimony of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman of the SEC); Wallace Timmeny, An
Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 235, 236-37 (1982).
3. Zarin, supra note 2.
4. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure:
Hearings on S. 305 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
95th Cong. 116-18 (1977).
5. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May 14, 1976).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1977).
7. Zarin, supra note 2, 1-2.
8. Id. at 1-2 (explaining that Congress justified the legislation, in part, by noting
that a prohibition on bribery would ensure that the market was functioning properly and
reward efficient business practices).
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ethical business practices. 9 Taking advantage of the public interest in
policing corporations more closely, the Department of Justice has
demonstrated, both through prosecutions and public statements, a
commitment to aggressively prosecute corporate bribery. 10 Moreover,
the unwillingness of many corporate defendants to challenge the Justice
Department’s theory of liability in court, opting instead to accept a quick
plea agreement in order to minimize negative publicity, has left
prosecutors with an almost unchecked authority to define the contours of
FCPA liability. Accordingly, not until very recently has it become
possible to appreciate just how drastic and far reaching the Department
of Justice’s use of the FCPA will be.
The short and relatively straightforward text of the Act belies the
scope of liability sought by federal prosecutors. The Department of
Justice’s recent aggressive enforcement of the FCPA’s provisions has
served to illustrate numerous unanticipated theories of liability. This
article argues that corporate defendants are now faced with a “Hobson’s
Choice”: either accept the Department of Justice’s broad and
unprincipled application of the FCPA, or confront the prolonged
negative press that is sure to accompany a legal challenge to various
theories of FCPA liability. Specifically, in light of the recent upswing in
prosecutions, and interpretations being made by the Department of
Justice, parent companies, franchisors, non-U.S. residents, and other
persons or entities with attenuated links to public officials face the risk
of being charged under the FCPA. As discussed below, not all of these
theories of liability are the product of a reasoned interpretation of the
FCPA.
II. FCPA LIABILITY GENERALLY
The FCPA makes it unlawful to bribe foreign government officials
in order to obtain or retain business. 11 The FCPA applies to individuals,
9. Marie Leone, Coming Clean about Bribery, CFO.com, Apr. 03, 2006 available
at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/6764209?f=related (quoting a senior Department of
Justice attorney as saying that there is “a new vigilance at the Department of Justice in
terms of identifying and prosecuting FCPA violators”).
10. Id.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2005). The statute states that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any domestic concern . . . , or for any officer, director,
employee, or agent of such domestic concern . . . , to make use of the mails or any
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firms, officers, directors, employees, agents of a firm, and any
stockholder acting on behalf of a firm. In order to obtain a conviction
under the anti-bribery portion of the statute, the government must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is:
1. a domestic concern 12 (any corporation, partnership,
association, . . . which has its principal place of
business in the U.S., or which is organized under the
laws of a state), 13
2. that made use of a means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, 14
3. corruptly, 15
4. in furtherance 16 of an offer or payment of anything of
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer,
payment, [or] promise to pay . . . anything of value to . . . (3) any person, while
knowing that all or a portion of such money . . . will be offered, given, or promised,
directly or indirectly, to any foreign official . . . for purposes of (A)(i) influencing any
act or decision of such foreign official . . . in his . . . official capacity.

Id.
12. Issuers, defined as entities that have a class of securities registered pursuant to
§ 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, are also liable for violations of the FCPA. See 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2005). Issuers are subject to the same requirements under the
FCPA as domestic concerns; however, because a company’s status as an issuer is easily
determined and uncontroversial, this article focuses on the liability of domestic
concerns. Id.
13. The complete definition of “domestic concern” covers an even larger group of
persons and entities: individual U.S. citizens (wherever located), U.S. resident aliens,
corporations, and other business entities organized under the laws of a state of the
United States or having their principal place of business in the United States, and
officers, directors, employees, and agents of these entities, regardless of their
nationality. See 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(1).
14. Generally speaking, courts have taken a very broad interpretation of “interstate
commerce” such that this jurisdictional requirement will, in most cases, be easily
satisfied. The Act itself provides an exhaustive definition of interstate commerce. 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), 2(a), 2(h)(5).
15. The term “corruptly” was explained in the legislative history of the FCPA:
“[the term] is used to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift must be
intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order wrongfully to
direct business to the payor or his client.” S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977) (emphasis
added). In other words, there must be some sort of evil motive or purpose behind the
payment. For a complete discussion of the interpretation of “corruptly,” see generally
Gary M. Elden & Mark S. Sablemann, Negligence Is Not Corruptive: The Scienter
Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (1981).
Notably, it is the subjective intent of the payor that is determinative, and the bribe need
not be successful in order for liability to exist. Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-15.
16. The “in furtherance” language was included to emphasize that the use of the
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value to any person,
5. while knowing 17 that anything of value 18 would be
offered or given directly or indirectly to any foreign
official, and 19
6. for purposes of influencing any act or decision of such
foreign official in his official capacity.
In the straightforward context of a single company or individual
directly involved in the challenged payments, FCPA liability likely
exists if these elements are satisfied and an exception or defense does
not apply. However, as the following discussion of three recent
prosecutions under the FCPA illustrates, determining whether the
elements of liability are satisfied when applied to a complicated
instrumentality of commerce did not have to be essential to the scheme of corrupt
payments. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, (1989) (recognizing that the
use of an instrumentality of commerce need only be incident to an essential part of the
scheme).
17. Knowledge, for purposes of the FCPA, does not require actual knowledge. The
relevant portions of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(2), -2(h)(3), provide for liability in
circumstances where the individual or entity consciously disregards impropriety. H.R.
REP. NO. 100-576, at 918-19, (1988) (Conf. Rep.) as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1951-52. Commentators have suggested that this applies to both past and future
corrupt payments. See, e.g., Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-38.
18. Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-29 (noting that, as used in other statutes, the term has
been construed broadly to include “both tangible and intangible benefits that an official
subjectively believes to be of value”).
19. The definition of “foreign official” is somewhat broader than the term implies.
For purposes of the FCPA, a “foreign official” is “any officer or employee of a foreign
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting
in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency,
or instrumentality, or for on behalf of any such public international organization.” 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2). In the past, the Department of Justice has suggested using the
FCPA Opinion Procedure for particular questions as to the definition—i.e., whether a
member of the royal family, or a member of legislative body, or an official of a stateowned business constitute foreign officials. Without requesting Department of Justice
guidance, however, the obvious take-away point is that prosecutors are taking a liberal
view as to what constitutes a foreign official. Dep’t of Justice brochure, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/dojdocb.htm; see, e.g., FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT v.1, 106.020 (2005) (explaining that the FCPA “has broad coverage and
can apply to individuals whose ‘official’ status may not be readily apparent”); FCPA
Op. No. 03-01 (Jan. 15, 2003) (assuming without discussing “that payments to
individuals employed by foreign state-owned entities to obtain or retain business”
constitute payments to foreign officials for purposes of FCPA liability); FCPA Op. No.
94-01 (May 13, 1994).
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corporate entity is far from mechanical.
III. THREE RECENT FCPA ACTIONS
Previous prosecutorial actions by government attorneys must be
analyzed in order to develop the new concepts of liability I will discuss
in this article. I will discuss the following three anti-corruption
enforcement actions: (1) the Oily Rock indictment; (2) the “NatWest
Three” case; and (3) the Diagnostic Products plea. These three will
provide the basis necessary for understanding why I propose the new
theories of possible liability.
In October 2005, the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York indicted three individuals for their respective roles
in an alleged bribery scheme relating to the privatization of the
Azerbaijani oil industry. 20 These indictments raise rather novel issues
regarding culpability, in that at least one of the individuals, David
Pinkerton, was not alleged to have been involved in making any of the
bribe payments or in negotiating any of the bribes.21
In 2002, three citizens of the United Kingdom who lived and
worked in England, the now infamous “NatWest Three,” were indicted
and extradited for their role in a complicated accounting scheme
involving their employers NatWest and Enron. 22 The criminal charges
against these men has stirred considerable controversy regarding the
Department of Justice’s decision to prosecute persons who are not
residents or citizens of the United States, or responsible for any harm to
a U.S. company. Nonetheless, the trials of these men will likely be
scheduled within the next few months. 23
The final example used to illustrate the Department of Justice’s
20. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Announces Charges in Massive Scheme to
Bribe Senior Government Officials in The Republic Of Azerbaijan (Oct. 6, 2005),
available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/October%2005/Kozeny%20et
%20al.% 20Indictment%20PR.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Indictment, U.S. v. David Bermingham, Giles Darby, and Gary Mulgrew,
(Sept. 12, 2002), available at news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usbrmnghm91202
ind.pdf.
23. Id. Similarly, in July 2006, a case was brought against three former employees
of a Swiss Company, ABB. All three are U.K. citizens. Litigation Release, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Files FCPA Charges Against Four Former Senior Employees of
ABB Ltd. Subsidiaries (July 5, 2006) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2006/lr19754.htm.
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aggressive FCPA posture is the guilty plea by a wholly owned Chinese
subsidiary to anti-bribery charges. In 2005, Diagnostic Products
Corporation, a wholly owned Chinese subsidiary, pled guilty to a
violation of the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA. This plea was made
despite the fact that the foreign entity, on the face of the pleading,
appears not to have committed a single act in furtherance of the corrupt
payments while in the United States. These three examples are
illustrative of recent FCPA cases being brought by federal prosecutors,
and serve as a meaningful starting point for assessing the likelihood of
prosecution in several historically controversial FCPA fact patterns.
These three cases will be discussed in more detail below.
A. Oily Rock Charges
In October 2005, federal prosecutors announced charges in what
was called a “massive scheme to bribe senior government officials in the
republic of Azerbaijan.” 24 The indictments charged that Viktor Kozeny,
along with his attorney and associate, carried out a scheme to bribe
Azeri officials in order to induce privatization of the country’s stateowned oil company. 25 According to the indictment, Kozeny’s ultimate
purpose in offering the bribes was to ensure that his investment
company, Oily Rock, gained a controlling interest in what was to
become a lucrative private oil company. 26 Kozeny’s bribery scheme,
though unique in magnitude, 27 does not raise any particularly interesting
FCPA issues. However, the indictment of several U.S. investors who
had invested substantial amounts of money in Kozeny’s privatization
scheme, either on their own, or for the investment funds they managed,
is a notable example of the Justice Department’s aggressive application
of the FCPA.
Over time, Kozeny recruited other individual and institutional

24. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Announces Charges in Massive Scheme to
Bribe Senior Government Officials in The Republic Of Azerbaijan (Oct. 6, 2005),
available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/October%2005/Kozeny%20et
%20al.%20Indictment%20PR.pdf.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id.
27. The indictment alleged that Kozeny had flown “millions of dollars of cash [for
use in the bribery scheme] into Azerbaijan on [his] private jet.” Id. at 3.
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investors to join in the scheme. 28 One such investor was David
Pinkerton, who was responsible for overseeing AIG’s investments in
Azerbaijan. The indictment alleges that Pinkerton, in his capacity as a
managing director for AIG, invested around $15,000,000 in Kozeny’s
scheme. 29
By charging Pinkerton for his investment in Kozeny’s companies,
including Oily Rock, the Department of Justice has demonstrated a
willingness to spend government resources to prosecute individuals who
were not in any way involved in negotiating or paying bribes to foreign
officials. 30 The government does not allege that Pinkerton himself was
engaged in any unsavory conduct; indeed, it seems that Pinkerton simply
invested some of AIG’s assets in Kozeny’s various entities. The
government does allege, however, that Pinkerton had knowledge of the
fact that Kozeny “entered into a corrupt financial relationship,” and that
this knowledge constitutes a sufficient nexus to the scheme to give rise
to FCPA liability. 31
The implications of the Oily Rock indictment are fairly obvious.
Consistent with the Department of Justice’s clearly stated intent to “hone
in on FCPA violators,” 32 the indictment of individuals like Pinkerton
reflects the trend of aggressive and unflinching enforcement actions
under the FCPA. Pinkerton, a managerial investment banker, had what
can only be described as an attenuated connection to Kozeny’s scheme.
Pinkerton did not pay any bribes, nor did he negotiate or facilitate any of
those bribes. It seems that he did not even directly authorize the
improper payments to Azeri officials. 33 Pinkerton’s 2005 indictment
demonstrates the Department of Justice’s willingness to pursue and
prosecute not just the key players in a bribery scheme, but anyone who
facilitates a scheme, and is subject to federal FCPA jurisdiction.
Though not at odds with the text of the Act, prosecutions like this are

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Pinkerton continues to deny any knowledge of Kozeny’s bribery scheme. His
lawyer was recently quoted as saying, “Pinkerton first heard this allegation [of bribery]
in response to his efforts to chase Viktor Kozeny around the globe to recoup AIG’s
investment.” Rob Urban & David Glovin, Capturing the Pirate of Prague, Bloomberg
Market Reports (Mar. 2006).
32. Marie Leone, Coming Clean About Bribery, CFO.com, Apr. 3, 2006, available
at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/6764209/c_2984290/?f=archives.
33. Id.
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indicative of the willingness of prosecutors to devote precious time and
effort to prosecute those who have only a secondary role in a corrupt
scheme.
B. The NatWest Three Case
In 2002, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
Texas issued an indictment that is illustrative of the Department of
Justice’s willingness to doggedly pursue corruption prosecutions despite
serious foreign sovereignty issues. 34 Though the prosecution was for
wire fraud, federal prosecutors exhibited no compunction about
prosecuting persons and entities who had only minimal or secondary
connections to the United States. 35 Giles Darby, David Bermingham,
and Gary Mulgrew, (“the NatWest Three,”) were indicted on charges
relating to their role in the Enron scandal. Specifically, the NatWest
Three are charged with persuading their employer, NatWest, to sell an
investment company at a fraction of its value to the CFO of Enron, who
in turn split the profits with the three men. 36 All three of the NatWest
defendants were United Kingdom nationals. All three resided and
worked in England, and the harm caused by the corrupt deal, it appears,
was visited only upon NatWest, a United Kingdom bank. Therefore,
what makes this prosecution interesting is its total lack of connection to
the United States.
Despite the lack of a clear connection to U.S. interests in the case,
federal prosecutors deemed the individuals conduct, viewed as “in
furtherance” of the corrupt scheme that occurred in the U.S., a sufficient
basis for prosecution. This makes clear that the Department of Justice
will prosecute non-U.S. citizens whose corrupt behavior does not
directly harm U.S. interests on the theory that corruption, be it indirect
or otherwise, must be prosecuted in order to establish the appropriate
international culture of deterrence. As one commentator put it, the
“NatWest Three” case is a “particularly dramatic example of the
aggressive extension of U.S. law beyond its borders.” 37
34. Indictment, U.S. v. David Bermingham, Giles Darby, and Gary Mulgrew,
(Sept. 12, 2002), available at news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usbrmnghm91202
ind.pdf.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Matt Morley, Bung Patrol, Aug. 31, 2006, available at http://www.
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C. The Diagnostics Guilty Plea
A final example of the Department of Justice’s increasingly
aggressive approach to corruption is a 2005 FCPA enforcement action
against DPC. 38 The DPC enforcement action is perhaps the clearest
example of the willingness of federal prosecutors to pursue criminal
charges in cases where either jurisdiction, or liability, or both, is
anything but obvious. That is to say, DPC is indicative of a growing
body of enforcement actions featuring federal prosecutors willing to
expend resources investigating and prosecuting corruption cases where
the statutory authority for such prosecutions is, at best, strained.
DPC, a producer and seller of diagnostic medical equipment, was
charged with violating the FCPA for its role in the payment of $1.6
million in bribes to physicians and laboratory personnel employed by
government-owned hospitals in China. 39 The alleged bribes were paid
between 1991 and 2002 in order to obtain and retain business
relationships with these hospitals. 40 Specifically, it was alleged that
DPC “made cash payments to laboratory personnel and physicians
employed in certain hospitals . . . in exchange for agreements that the
hospitals would obtain [DPC’s products and services].” 41 What makes
this enforcement action significant is the theory of jurisdiction that
prosecutors adopted in this case.
Following the 1998 amendments to the FCPA, foreign national
employees and subsidiaries were subject to independent FCPA liability
for the first time. 42 Under the amendments, foreign nationals and
corporations were subject to liability under the FCPA so long as the
person or entity committed an act in furtherance of the corrupt payment
“while in the territory of the United States.” 43 It is clear from both the
plain text of amendments, 44 and the legislative history 45 that the exercise
thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=121582.
38. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, DPC (Tianjin) Ltd. Charged with Violating The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 20, 2005), available at www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
fraud /press/dpcfcpa.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105366, § 4, 112 Stat. 3302, 3306 (1998).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-8 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-802 to accompany H.R.
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of independent jurisdiction over a foreign entity was limited to those
situations where the foreign entity committed an act in furtherance of the
bribe while in the United States. However, DPC was a wholly owned
Chinese subsidiary of a California company that had not itself
committed any acts within the United States. 46
Prior to this case, commentators and practitioners had agreed that
liability would not exist on these facts because there was no indication
that DPC satisfied the prerequisites for FCPA liability under the 1998
amendments. Based on the text of the plea agreement, it appears that the
prosecutors charged DPC with violations of the FCPA on the theory that
DPC was acting as an “agent” of its U.S.-based parent company. 47
Prosecuting DPC as an agent of its parent company, however, is
inconsistent with legislative history suggesting that the 1998
Amendments provided the first and only basis for foreign subsidiary
liability, and is in direct tension with the only case law on point. 48
Indeed, courts had concluded that permitting foreign subsidiary liability
under the provisions of the FCPA allowing for “agent” liability
contravened the clear legislative history on the question of foreign entity
liability. 49 Congress had specifically considered extending liability to
foreign entities and declined to do so.50
Whether right or wrong, the DPC prosecution represented a
dramatic departure from previous norms regarding the appropriate scope
of FCPA prosecutions, and signals an increasingly aggressive policy of
prosecution that individuals and entities must deal with. The remainder
of this Article will use cases like DPC, ultimately resolved through a
guilty plea, 51 as a weathervane to predict how federal prosecutors will
respond to many of the remaining or common questions regarding
FCPA liability.

4353, International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 21 (Oct. 8, 1998)).
46. Press Release, supra note 37; Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-9, 4-10.
47. Zarin, supra note 2, 4-10 (citing Plea Agreement, United States v. DPC
(Tianjin) Co. Ltd., (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
48. See supra note 45 (regarding the relevant legislative history); Dooley v. United
Techs. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1992).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Press Release, supra note 37.
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IV. BEYOND THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE STATUTE:
THE LONG ARM OF THE FCPA
Given the tenor and scope of recent FCPA indictments, several
theories of liability under the FCPA seem to be gaining traction. This
Article discusses situations in which liability does not appear to be
obvious from the plain text of the FCPA.
A. Parent Company Liability Under the FCPA
The least controversial, and most routinely accepted extension of
FCPA liability concerns parent company liability. Although the FCPA
does not contain specific provisions regarding parent company liability,
commentators and the Department of Justice have conclusively
established that parent companies may face liability for the actions of
their foreign or domestic subsidiaries based on three somewhat
overlapping theories: (1) direct liability, (2) indirect liability, and (3)
agency liability, with parent company liability under the FCPA being
triggered if the relationship between the parent and the improper
payments at issue satisfies the requirements for liability under any one
of the three. 52
1. Direct Liability
The first basis for parent company liability turns on whether or not
the parent was directly involved in the improper conduct. 53 The FCPA
specifically provides for direct parent liability in several circumstances:
(1) the commission of an act “in furtherance of” the improper payment
by the parent entity; (2) the “authorization” by the parent company of
the subsidiary’s action; or (3) a direct offer, promise or transfer of value
by the parent. 54 Stated more succinctly, the parent corporation may be
held liable for the acts of its foreign subsidiaries when the parent
authorizes, directs, or controls the activity in question. 55
Because the FCPA does not provide a specific basis for parent
52. See, e.g., Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1998).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (2005).
55. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Anti-Bribery Provisions 3
(1999).
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company liability, each of the elements discussed above must be present.
Accordingly, as with any other entity or individual, liability under the
FCPA is predicated on “knowledge.” The parent is not liable absent
knowledge of the corrupt purpose of the payment. 56 For purposes of the
FCPA, a person acts with “knowledge” if: (1) the person is aware that he
or she is engaging in the conduct; (2) the person has a firm belief that a
result is substantially certain to occur; 57 or (3) “if a person is aware of a
high probability of the existence of such circumstance . . . .” 58 While the
requisite state of mind under the FCPA includes conscious disregard, or
willful blindness, 59 the legislative history is clear in reflecting that mere
negligence does not provide a basis for liability. Congress was instead
concerned with the “head-in-the-sand problem.” 60
2. Indirect Liability
The FCPA prohibits a domestic concern, or its agent, from giving
anything of value to another person while “knowing that this third party
will make an improper payment to a foreign official.” 61 This broad
definition of knowledge for purposes of the FCPA, allows criminal
liability to be grounded on acquiescence in the subsidiary’s corrupt
payment. 62 Mere inaction on the part of the parent company may
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A). The statute does not appear to criminalize
innocent knowledge of a payment that turns out to be improper. Parent liability under
the FCPA only exists where all of the elements of the crime are satisfied, and the
knowledge element cannot be separated from the corrupt payment element. Thus,
although a parent can be liable for the actions of its subsidiaries, the plain text of the
statute dictates that liability only exists when the domestic concern has knowledge of
the corrupt purpose of the payment. The FCPA provides in relevant part that the
domestic concern is only liable if it has “know[ledge] that all or a portion of [the]
money . . . will be offered . . . for purposes of . . . (A)(i) influencing any act or decision
of [a] foreign official.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). In other words, a “corrupt payment” is
one that is made to influence a foreign official and there cannot be liability under the
FCPA unless the domestic concern had knowledge, not just of the payment, but of the
fact that payment was made “for purposes of” influencing a foreign official. Id.
57. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(3)(A)(I).
58. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(3)(B).
59. See U. S. v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 277-88 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying a similar
mental state requirement in a separate context).
60. H.R. Rep. No. 100-579, at 920 (1988) (Conf. Rep.).
61. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(3)(A).
62. See United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, 427 F.2d 969, 971 (10th
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provide a basis for FCPA liability because the parent may be treated as
having implicitly authorized the payment. For example, if the parent
became aware of an improper payment and did not do anything to stop
it, a court may consider this acquiescence in the payments to be a
sufficient basis for FCPA liability.
It is important to note that where a parent company exercises
control over a subsidiary or affiliate, the failure to address red flags
regarding corrupt payments presents a real risk that the parent may be
charged with knowledge of said corrupt payment. 63 In the alternative, if
the parent company can show that it did not have any knowledge of the
corrupt payments, liability under the FCPA does not attach. 64
As discussed above, acquiescence in corrupt payments made by a
subsidiary may create liability exposure for the parent. A critical issue
for parent companies facing FCPA liability will be the extent to which
suspicious payments made by a subsidiary were documented and
discussed with the parent. If the putatively improper payments were
documented in a manner that should have raised red flags, there is a
strong argument that the parent is indirectly liable under a conscious
disregard theory of knowledge.
3. Agency Law and the FCPA
One theory of parent company liability that has remained beyond
the scope of the Justice Department’s broad reading of the FCPA is a
strict application of common law principles of agency. If the
Department of Justice sought to apply agency law to FCPA
prosecutions, a court could find that the parent company had
constructive knowledge if the subsidiary is deemed to be acting as an
agent of the parent. Basic agency law treats a “master or other principal
. . . [as] liable to another whose interests have been invaded by the
tortious conduct of a servant or other agent, although the principal does

Cir.1970) (imputing knowledge of domestic conspiracy charge based on conduct of a
recently acquired company).
63. See, e.g., ABA Center for Continuing Legal Education, Parent Company
Liability Under the FCPA, (2002) (providing the following example: “if management of
the subsidiary reports to the parent a request for payments by local officials, the failure
of the parent to react to that information—even if it is mentioned in cryptic terms as an
aside at a management meeting or late at night over drinks in a bar to a single parent
official—may create a situation of arguable ‘knowledge’ for the parent.”).
64. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(3)(A).

2007

A LITTLE LESS CONVERSATION,
A LITTLE MORE ACTION

299

not personally violate a duty.” 65 Where corporate liability is concerned,
the agent’s act must be intended, at least in part, to benefit the
corporation. 66 According to agency law, if a foreign entity is found to
be an agent of a domestic concern, the domestic concern may be held
vicariously liable for the corrupt practices of that foreign affiliate. 67
Courts have held that the existence of an agency relationship
between a parent and a subsidiary is a question of fact to be determined
at trial. 68 As one commentator has noted, “[t]he touchstone of
parent/subsidiary agency liability is the involvement of the parent in the
affairs of the subsidiary.” 69 The question of whether or not an agency
relationship exists depends on the degree of control that the parent
enjoys over the subsidiary, not on whether a majority of voting shares
are held by the parent. 70
To date, the Department of Justice appears to use the control
inherent in an agency relationship merely as indicia of the culpable
knowledge required for criminal liability. However, if agency law was
truly extended to the FCPA, in circumstances where sufficient authority
and control over the foreign affiliate is found, 71 the parent corporation
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216 (1958); U.S. v. Armour & Co., 168
F.2d 342 (3rd Cir. 1948).
66. William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 4877.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Royal Indus. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 926 F.Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
69. Brown, supra note 52, at 36.
70. As a practical matter, practitioners have identified several indicia of an agency
relationship: (1) The entity owns all or a majority of the stock of the foreign affiliate;
(2) The entity and the foreign affiliate have common directors or officers; (3) The entity
finances the foreign affiliate; (4) The foreign affiliate has grossly inadequate capital;
(5) The entity pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the foreign affiliate; (6) The
foreign affiliate has substantially no business except with the entity or no assets except
those conveyed to it by the entity; (7) The entity formally refers to the foreign affiliate
as a subsidiary, department, or division; (8) The directors or management of the foreign
affiliate do not act independently in its interests but take direction from the entity. See
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Continuing
Legal Education, 2003 WL 22002142 (2003).
71. Although the factors outlined above are useful, the best indicator as to whether
an agency relationship exists is practical control. In the words of one commentator,
“Practical control will have much greater bearing than technical legal considerations [in
determining whether a foreign company is an agent of the domestic concern.]” Stuart
H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New International Norms 35
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may be liable for any violations of the FCPA regardless of actual
knowledge or conscious disregard. A domestic concern that exerts a
sufficient level of control over a foreign affiliate to establish an agency
relationship faces the same responsibility for preventing improper
payments by the foreign affiliate as it does with its own employees. 72
Although it does not appear that there have been any federal
prosecutions based on this agency theory of liability alone, given the
Justice Department’s relatively unchecked approach to FCPA liability,
companies need to anticipate FCPA liability for the conduct of its agentsubsidiaries.
In sum, a parent corporation is liable for the corrupt payments made
by its subsidiary if: (1) the parent is directly responsible for the
subsidiary’s action—i.e., authorizes the payment; (2) the parent has
knowledge of the corrupt payment 73 —i.e., impliedly authorizes the
payment; or, theoretically, (3) an agency relationship exists between the
parent and the subsidiary such that the subsidiary is deemed acting as an
agent of the parent. While the third theory of liability remains
theoretical, insofar as no prosecutions have utilized this basis, it is more
consistent with the indirect liability provisions of the FCPA than other
theories advanced by the Department of Justice. 74
B. Liability of a Franchisor
In light of the Justice Department’s overall aggressive posture
toward bribery payments, it appears highly likely that the Department of
Justice will be willing to prosecute, under FCPA law, a franchisor for
the acts of a franchisee. Vicarious franchisor liability traditionally arises
from a franchisor’s interest in protecting its franchise name. Protection
for the franchise name is accomplished by actively prohibiting unsavory
(2005).
72. If an agency relationship exists and the domestic concern learns that the foreign
affiliate has made corrupt payments, the domestic concern must affirmatively repudiate
the unlawful conduct and take significant measures to prevent its recurrence in order to
avoid FCPA liability. Id.
73. The FCPA’s imputation of knowledge to one who consciously disregards
information establishes a standard of knowledge considerably broader than actual
knowledge. Under this standard, if an individual or entity becomes aware of
questionable conduct by a related third party, it must be diligent in undertaking its own
inquiry. A failure to inquire when red flags exist could result in the imputation of
knowledge to an individual or entity regarding the improper conduct.
74. See supra note 38 (regarding the DPC charges).
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businesspersons from obtaining a license to sell products under that
name. Based on previous Justice Department action, franchisor liability,
much like indirect parent liability, appears to be premised on conscious
disregard of the wrongdoers’ actions, and the presumption that
significant due diligence occurred in determining whether a particular
entity is or is not worthy of a franchise license. This expectation of due
diligence is premised, in large part, on provisions of The Lanham Act. 75
Under the Lanham Act, a trademark may be deemed abandoned if said
mark is used in such a manner so as to cause a loss of significance. In
order to avoid losing the benefits of the trademark, companies must
protect against deceptive uses by other persons or companies. It appears
likely that, if litigated, the Department of Justice will argue a company’s
protection of its trademark gives rise to an agency relationship, and
therefore, vicarious liability.
Courts, without more, have been unwilling to equate this defense of
image to the control and accountability that renders it vicariously liable
for the acts of its franchisee; 76 that said, however, this relationship may
dictate that vicarious liability is appropriate. 77 Terms of the franchise
agreement, as well as their course of dealings, may determine whether
the franchisor enjoyed a level of control over the franchisee sufficient to
justify vicarious liability. 78 The Fifth Circuit has found sufficient
evidence of control by the franchisor where the franchisee, among other
things, agreed to abide by the “rules of operation” promulgated by the

75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. An oft cited example of the need for franchisor due
diligence is the recent anti-terrorism laws. For example, Executive Order 13224
prohibits transactions with suspected terrorists and although the order is silent as to
franchisor liability, franchise lawyers have suggested that the franchisor has duties
under this law. According to some practitioners, franchisors are responsible for
conducting thorough due diligence in order to assess whether the prospective franchisee
is at risk for violating this law. Id. If this executive order, and other provisions of the
PATRIOT ACT, which make no specific reference to franchisor liability, are
understood to require extreme caution on the part of the franchisor in determining
whether a specific company would conduct the franchise in a manner consistent with
these laws, it is reasonable to conclude that the FCPA also could be applied to
companies involved in international franchising.
76. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker Inc., 59 Cal. App 4th (1997) (holding that
franchisor’s receipt of royalty payment did not create true agency relationship such that
franchisor could be liable for acts and omissions of franchisee’s broker).
77. See discussion of indirect liability, supra Part IV.A.2.
78. Id.
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franchisor, built and maintained the premises and decorations in a
manner consistent with the franchisor’s specifications, and agreed to
allow inspection of the facility by the franchisor.79 This case shows that
a court can hold a franchisor vicariously liable for the FCPA violations
of its franchisee if said franchisor retains a certain level of control and
authority over the franchisee. 80 There is little doubt that the Department
of Justice will attempt to assert franchisor liability; when, however,
evidence of actual knowledge of corrupt payments is lacking, a strong
argument can be made that a franchisor cannot be held liable under the
FCPA. It is highly probable that the Department of Justice will, until
deprived of the argument by published opinion, consider franchisors
liable for improper payments made by a franchisee.
C. Successor Liability
It is becoming increasingly clear that the Department of Justice will
attempt to prosecute domestic companies for acquiring a foreign entity if
said foreign entity has escaped FCPA liability solely because it was not
a U.S. company at the time the improper payments were made. In
certain circumstances, the actions of a foreign company prior to its
acquisition by a domestic corporation may raise FCPA issues for the
acquiring company. This stems from the fact that the Department of
Justice does not want to create incentives for foreign companies to bribe
public officials by allowing U.S. companies to acquire them at such a
price and in such a manner so as to effectively reimburse the foreign
company for its corrupt payments. The indirect liability provisions of
the FCPA trigger a U.S. acquirer company’s liability. 81 Consistent with
liability in normal circumstances, the U.S. successor company’s FCPA
liability turns on whether it had knowledge of, or authorized, a corrupt
payment.
Generally, commentators seem to agree that a “U.S. company
should not be liable for the activities of a foreign partner or related
79. Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 509 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Nichols v.
Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 610 (1967).
80. At this point, companies are still left to speculate as to what sort of control
would be sufficient to justify franchisor vicarious liability. It seems clear, however, that
the Department of Justice will be willing to prosecute a franchisor who, rather than
simply passively receiving quarterly financials, plays an active role in the day-to-day
management of the franchisee’s business.
81. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(a)(3) (2005).
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company prior to entering the relationship.” 82 However, neither the text
of the statute, the annotations, or case law, provides guidance on this
issue. Given the Department of Justice’s aggressive application of the
FCPA, U.S. companies may face liability if circumstances are such that
the Department of Justice can reasonably argue that the FCPA’s
knowledge requirement has been satisfied. Specifically, if a bribe was
paid in order to secure a benefit that the acquiring U.S. company will
share, and the acquiring U.S. company authorized the payment, or was
aware of and consciously disregarded the probability of such a payment
occurring, then the company can be charged as vicariously liable. 83 The
limited authority available on this topic suggest two significant factors in
determining possible successor liability for past actions: (1) the extent of
due diligence conducted to identify and address potential issues; and
(2) the extent and effectiveness of safeguards adopted to foreclose
reimbursement by the U.S. company for past improper actions and to
prevent the acquired company from taking improper action in the
future. 84
Viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, a successor
company may face liability for bribes paid by an acquired company
when it is reasonable to conclude that the successor company is
effectively reimbursing the acquired company for prior bribes, or where
the successor acquires a company with knowledge of the fact that the
acquired company will make such payments in the future. Successor
liability shares a critical common denominator with the theories of
parent company indirect liability discussed above: where the U.S. parent
or successor company authorizes a bribe, FCPA liability attaches. 85
Accordingly, an acquiring company’s first obligation must be to conduct
sufficient due diligence in order to document the fact that they are not
aware of, or consciously disregarding, any past corrupt payments. If the
acquiring company learns that the acquired entity paid bribes in the past,
the acquiring company faces additional hurdles required to remain clear
of FCPA liability. 86
82.
83.
84.
85.

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT v.1, 106.013, (2005).
Id.
Id.
Zarin, supra note 2, at 4-35 n.133 (noting that knowledge of the illicit payment
is an implicit predicate to “authorization”).
86. Specifically, the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange
Commission have emphasized that acquiring companies that discover FCPA issues in
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D. Controlling and Non-Controlling Investors
A related but distinct issue of parent company liability is whether a
domestic company with an ownership interest in a foreign company may
face FCPA liability. While a parent-subsidiary relationship dictates a
degree of control authority in favor of the parent, companies with an
investment interest in foreign companies—e.g, investment funds—may
not enjoy the same effective control over the business operations of that
foreign company; in spite of this difference, it is likely that federal
prosecutors will bring charges in these circumstances.
The plain text of the FCPA does not distinguish between a
controlling and non-controlling affiliation.87 As with the other theories
of liability discussed in this Article, the company’s liability will hinge
on whether the U.S. company had knowledge of, and authorized, the
improper conduct; not on a formal arrangement of control or a majority
stake ownership. Accordingly, it is possible that an investment company
owning a majority of shares in a foreign company might not face FCPA
liability for improper payments made by the foreign company, while an
investment company owning a minority of shares in the same company
might, based on its knowledge of the foreign company’s conduct. This
question is one of function over form: a majority shareholder is more
likely to face FCPA liability because the majority shareholder is more
likely to have knowledge of any corrupt relationship between the foreign
company and public officials, not because it owns a majority of the
pre-transaction due diligence are expected to commit to implement “rigorous”
anticorruption compliance programs. FCPA Opinion Procedure Rel. 04-02. An
illustrative example is FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 03-01 (January 15, 2003). In
this opinion the Department of Justice addressed the concerns of a requestor who had
intended to purchase the stock of a company, when during its due diligence the
requestor learned that officers of a foreign subsidiary of said company had authorized
payments to foreign officials to obtain business benefits. The Department of Justice
concluded that the following actions by the requestor were sufficient to alleviate
concern that by acquiring the company it would also acquire criminal and civil liability
for the past acts of the company’s employees: (1) continued cooperation and reporting
to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice regarding
the details of the past transactions, (2) discipline employees and officers who authorized
corrupt payments, (3) disclose any additional pre-acquisition payments to foreign
officials made by the acquired company, (4) a compliance program will be implemented
in the acquired company and all of its subsidiaries, and (5) requestor ensures that
acquired company implements a system of internal controls and makes and keeps
accurate books.
87. Zarin, supra note 2, at 6-11.
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shares of a company engaged in corrupt payments. 88
The question of FCPA liability for affiliating with foreign
companies will generally turn on whether the U.S. company had
knowledge of the improper conduct. This makes it particularly
important for companies to consider whether any employees of the U.S.
company are acting as officers or directors for the foreign affiliate. 89 If
a foreign company is involved in bribery payments, and employees of
the U.S. shareholder are acting as officers or directors, it is likely that
these officers or directors have knowledge of the bribes. Whether the
U.S. company is a controlling shareholder or not, it is likely that the
U.S. company will face FCPA liability. In order to avoid liability, the
U.S. company has to, at a minimum, disavow the acts of bribery and
take affirmative steps to avoid a reoccurrence. 90 Particularly in the case
of a U.S. majority owner of a foreign entity, however, FCPA liability
likely exists and these remedial measures, as well as continued selfreporting, serve only as an olive branch designed to mitigate harm and
minimize penalties. 91

88.
89.

Id.
The common law concept of constructive knowledge dictates that the
“knowledge of the employees is the knowledge of the corporation.” Apex Oil Co. v.
United States, 550 F.2d 1291, 1295 (8th Cir. 1976). No one employee or officer must
have all of the requisite knowledge. Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and the New International Norms 38 (2005). Moreover, “[r]egardless of how
disparate the knowledge may be within an entity, the collective knowledge of
employees of the entity . . . can serve as the basis for establishing knowledge.” Id.; see
also Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1951)
(attributing knowledge to entity despite the fact that “[n]o single agent or representative
in the offices of the company had actual knowledge of [the] conflicts and falsities);
United States v. LBS Bank, 757 F.Supp. 496, 501 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“[k]nowledge
possessed by employees is aggregated so that a corporate defendant is considered to
have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees . . .”). Thus, if an H&Q officer
had knowledge of the corrupt payments, the failure, at a minimum, to disavow the
conduct may be construed as authorization or acquiescence on the part of H&Q. Stuart
H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New International Norms 39
(2005).
90. Zarin, supra note 2, at 6-13; see also Donald R. Cruver, COMPLYING WITH THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 38-39, 54-55 (1999) (acknowledging that domestic
concerns may face FCPA liability where “there is ongoing voting or operation
control . . . , or where the parent and subsidiary have common officers or directors”).
91. It is also worth noting that business affiliations with foreign governments are
particularly fertile ground for FCPA problems. As one treatise has commented, “the
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E. Complicated Arrangements with Consultants
By now, commentators and corporations are well aware that
semantics do not dictate liability; accounting for bribery as “consulting
expenses” fools no one. 92 The line separating legal and legitimate
consulting agreements from mere conduits of bribery can be sketched
out using details of the Justice Department’s own aggressive pursuit of
FCPA prosecutions, as well as elements of emerging and increasingly
complex consulting agreements. Certain factors, such as the reputation
of the agent, the agent’s compensation, and any suspicious
accommodation requests, are relevant when determining whether a
domestic company’s decision to hire a particular agent will trigger
FCPA liability. 93 If the consultants hired have a reputation for bribing
officials, or other corrupt behavior, a presumption of knowing
impropriety exists. 94 Similarly, unreasonably large consulting fees in
light of services provided will trigger a suspicion that part of the fee
went toward an improper bribe. 95 Moreover, the more likely it is that
officers of the U.S. company knew of suspicious requests by the
consultant, 96 the easier the government’s decision to impute knowledge

mere formation of a joint venture or establishment of an investment relationship with
certain parties—for example, a foreign government official or someone closely
connected to such an official—can raise FCPA issues.” FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT v.1, 106.003 (2005). The FCPA does not distinguish between government officials
acting in a sovereign capacity and a government agency acting in a commercial
capacity. Accordingly, “virtually any transaction between a person subject to the FCPA
and the employees of a state-owned entity . . . can raise FCPA issues.” Id.
Relationships with state-owned entities will not always give rise to FCPA liability;
however, this sort of relationship raises issues that “must be addressed and [dictates
that] risk mitigation steps need to be taken.” Id. Given the extremely limited role that
San Yuan played in the management of BMD, a strong argument can be made that this
relationship, though suspicious, was not ultimately prohibited under the FCPA.
92. The payment of fees to “consultants” who perform no services has been
described as a paradigmatic example of an FCPA violation. FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT v.1, 106.002 (2005).
93. Donald R. Cruver, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
47 (1999).
94. See id. at 48.
95. Id at 49.
96. Suspicious requests would include any sort of payment or business practice that
is particularly unusual. A request for an all cash payment, or that part of the payment
be made out to a certain government official are obvious examples.
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of this impropriety to the company. 97
Even though they are not clearly prohibited by the text of the
statute, these factors suggest that the third-party provisions of the FCPA
implicitly prohibit many consulting agreements. Consider the following
example: a consultant was hired by a U.S. company to use his or her
“connections” to help secure a contract with the government of the
consultant’s home country. While it is not the case that consulting
agreements based on one’s connections are per se illegal, it is quite clear
that consulting agreements based on a financial, rather than personal,
relationship between said consultant and foreign officials can create
FCPA problems. If the hypothetical consultant described above made
routine payments to the foreign official in order to protect, or establish,
his or her relationships, the U.S. company’s knowledge of this
arrangement likely satisfies the FCPA’s knowledge requirement, and
suggests liability. Even though the U.S. company is not making direct
payments to the foreign official, and even though the consultant is not
just passing along a percentage of the U.S. company’s payment to the
public official, knowledge of an ongoing connection to a public official
based on periodic payments is likely a sufficient basis for FCPA
liability.
In short, consulting agreements will subject an entity to FCPA
liability if the “consultant” is in a corrupt relationship with the foreign
official. This is true even if the money being paid cannot be traced
directly to the consulting payments made by the entity. This theory of
liability is consistent with a plain text of the FCPA. A company in this
situation will be well served by an early guilty plea.
F. Foreign Entity Liability
One of the most surprising developments in the Department of
Justice’s implementation of the FCPA is the charging of foreign entities.
The 2005 charging of Diagnostic Products was the first occurrence.
This charge, and subsequent guilty plea, signals a potentially
monumental shift in the prosecution of bribery: and one that lacks a
solid legal basis. More so than the other theories of FCPA liability
discussed in this Article, the Justice Department’s newly clarified theory
of foreign entity liability must be challenged in court. The prosecution
97.

Id. at 50.
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of foreign entities, outside of certain narrowly defined statutory
parameters, must be struck down by federal courts. This conclusion is
grounded in both textual interpretation and the extensive legislative
history of the act.
Prior to 1998, the FCPA did not apply to foreign companies other
than “issuers” and foreign nationals. The 1998 amendments expanded
the FCPA to provide that a foreign company or person is now subject to
liability if it causes, either directly or through an agent, an act in
furtherance of the corrupt payment to take place while within the
territory of the United States. 98 It is, however, generally accepted that
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions do not apply to foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies who are acting on their own behalf, and not as agents
of covered persons. 99
Prior to the Diagnostics charging, 100 the Department of Justice had
enforced the Act in a manner consistent with its unambiguous legislative
history concerning foreign entity liability. The Department of Justice,
through a refusal to prosecute, had implicitly recognized that a foreign
subsidiary of a U.S. issuer or domestic concern can not be an agent of its
U.S. parent for FCPA purposes. 101 Accordingly, until the Diagnostics
case, it was safe to assume that foreign subsidiaries were not subject to
FCPA liability unless the entity committed an act in furtherance of a
prohibited payment while in the United States.
Following the enforcement action in the Diagnostics case, foreign

98.
99.

15 U.S.C. §78dd-3(a) (2005).
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). The fact that foreign
subsidiaries that do not satisfy the requirements for liability under the 1998
amendments do not generally face prosecution under the FCPA is evidenced by the
legislative history. As enacted by the House, domestic concerns were specifically
defined to include foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. The House viewed the
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries as necessary in order to foreclose “a
massive loop-hole.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 11-12 (1977) (Conf. Rep.). The Senate,
however, took a more restrictive approach to FCPA jurisdiction, and, in Conference, the
House conformed to the Senate such that the final legislation did not extend the FCPA’s
jurisdiction to foreign subsidiaries. The feared loophole was minimized, according to
the Conference Report, because the legislation made clear that “any issuer or domestic
concern which engages in bribery [] indirectly through any other person or entity would
[] be liable.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
100. See supra, notes 38-51 and accompanying text, discussing Diagnostic Products
Corporation’s guilty plea to FCPA charges.
101. Stanley J. Marcuss, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 1057 PLI/CORP
1223, 1232 (1998).
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entities that do not commit any acts within the U.S. must now face the
possibility of charges under the FCPA. Few commentators or
practitioners have suggested that the Department of Justice’s position in
charging Diagnostics is reasonable. 102 Given the opportunity, courts
will almost certainly strike such enforcement actions down as an
unjustified extension of federal jurisdiction. But until this happens,
foreign companies engaged in dealings resembling an agency
relationship with a U.S. company face the possibility of charges under
the FCPA. Realistically, the tandem effect of the ripeness doctrine
barring defendants from seeking an advisory opinion resolving this
question, and the priority that many directors will place on secreting
these issues as much as possible, may prevent a much needed judicial
check on these prosecutions.
V. CONCLUSION
The examples of recent FCPA charges discussed in this Article
prove that the expanding scope of the FCPA can no longer be viewed as
theoretical. Although the FCPA was born out of an SEC investigation
based on voluntary disclosures, and featured an adolescence
characterized by largely esoteric debate over ambiguous questions of
statutory interpretation, the scope of the now-maturing FCPA is
becoming alarmingly clear to U.S. companies and officers. Through the
Department of Justice’s aggressive enforcement of provisions and
principles previously considered academic, the FCPA has come of age.
It is finally possible to understand the severity and robustness of FCPA
liability. What began as a financial irritant for large companies has
become the Justice Department’s primary tool in preventing corruption.
In light of the aggressive stance taken by Justice Department
officials in the cases discussed above, it is becoming increasingly clear
that the Department of Justice is willing to prosecute entities and
individuals for conduct that is not obviously actionable under a plain
text reading of the FCPA. The Department of Justice’s cavalier
approach to FCPA liability is inconsistent with basic principles of
102. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S.
Government’s Campaign Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 407, 463 (1999) (“[i]t would appear to be equally implausible that Congress
would establish agency liability for foreign individuals while at the same time
excluding foreign entities from liability under the same circumstances”).
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federal jurisdiction, the plain text of the statute, and its extensive
legislative history. Unless a party is willing to litigate these issues, the
Department of Justice’s assertion of prosecutorial force will continue to
expand.
Corporate defendants have a strong interest in resolving these
matters quickly, given the flurry of unwanted media attention and the
corresponding depreciation in stock value that accompanies a bribery
scandal. It is of great benefit to federal prosecutors that the incentive to
litigate these cases is unusually low. Corporate defendants will continue
to operate under a regime in which prosecutors obtain guilty pleas to
meritless charges unless there is a challenge to the Department of
Justice’s authority to prosecute under the FCPA. The FCPA presents a
classic economic dilemma—the tragedy of the commons problem:
although virtually all corporations stand to benefit from an aggressive
litigation of these cases and the favorable case law that will likely result,
no single corporate defendant has been willing to risk its reputation and
the costs of litigating an issue that, in the normal context of public
criminal defense, would have been heavily litigated by now.
Distinct from the protracted appeals and habeas corpus proceedings
that ensure the integrity of ordinary criminal prosecutions, FCPA
prosecutions are characterized by self-reporting and guilty pleas.
Though it is hard to muster much sympathy for American corporations
charged with bribing foreign officials, the overwhelming incentive to
plead these cases out has provided the Department of Justice with an
unusual and unfair interpretive role over the FCPA. The Department of
Justice’s role as final interpreter must be stopped. A creative
collaboration, or courageous corporate defendant, is necessary in order
to bring the FCPA back in line with traditional criminal statutes and
basic principles of statutory interpretation. There is no question that the
FCPA’s incubation period—defined by more conversation and
controversy than actual prosecution—has given way to an era of
aggressive enforcement. However, emboldened by early success, and
likely aware of the free-rider dilemma the defendants are facing, the
Department of Justice has begun to pursue unreasonable theories of
FCPA liability. Just as the FCPA has evolved from talk to action, it is
time for FCPA defendants to take an active stance in opposing the
unreasonable extensions of FCPA liability. Only if defendants challenge
the validity of these theories of FCPA liability will aggressive and
unchecked prosecutions be brought under control.

